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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Whether

Great

Equity

Life

Insurance

Company

(hereinafter referred to as "Great Equity") is liable to
appellants for further costs and fees after making a good
and valid tender of its full liability on November 7, 1983.
2.

Whether Great Equity is liable to appellants

for attorney's fees when the issue was not raised at the
trial level and where there is no legal basis for such an
award.
3.

Whether Great Equity was entitled to a sati-

sfaction of judgment after having paid funds to General
Motors Acceptance Corporation pursuant to a garnishment.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Great

Equity

Life

Insurance

Company

(hereafter

Great Equity) concurs in the Statement of Facts provided
by

Plaintiff s,

General

Motors

Acceptance

Corporation

(hereafter GMAC) and adds the following facts relating to
activities

following

the

defendants1

second

attempt

to

appeal the case on October 13, 1983.
On November

7, 1983, Great Equity, through their

counsel, Mr. William J. Hansen, sent a letter to counsel
for GMAC, Mr. Jay Barney and counsel for defendants, Mr.
Mark Miner, tendering payment of the principal and interest
due according to the decisions of the District Court and
of the Utah Supreme Court in General Motors Acceptance
1

Corporation

v.

Martinez.

668

P.2d

498

(Utah

(R-535-539) (R-647-652, Exhibit A, herein).

1983),

A check for

$6,135.36, representing the full amount of the principal
($4,717.50), plus interest at the rate of 14.55 percent
from September 30, 1981, was included with a letter to Mr.
Barney.

Payees on the check were GMAC, Jay Barney, Hector

Martinez, Manuel Rivera, and Mark Miner

(R-648).

The

letter requested Mr. Barney to sign off on the check and
then forward it to the defendants for their acceptance,
conditional upon a satisfaction of judgment (R-647).

The

intent of the tender was to pay Great Equity's liability
in full and terminate the running of interest against it
(R-641-645).

Enclosed with the letter of tender to Mr.

Miner was a check for $742.85, representing tender of the
costs of court awarded by the Supreme Court (R-647, 652).
These costs were determined by the memorandum of Mr. Miner
and

were

approved

by

the

District

Court

(R-540-542,

584-585).
After signing off on the check for principal and
interest,

Mr.

Barney

attempted

Miner for his acceptance.
Mr.

Miner

on November

to

present

it

to

Mr.

Mr. Barney specifically informed
16, 1983, that he was

free to

reserve his rights relative to attorney's fees, the only
issue

then

pending

before

the

courts,

in

signing

satisfaction of judgment accompanying the check

the

(Exhibit

C, herein, pending submission to the record). Mr. Barney
2

also sought other occasion to present the check to Mr.
Miner (R-650).
Mr. Miner rejected both the tender of costs and the
tender of principal and interest without objection or even
comment to either Mr. Barney of Mr. Hansen.

Consequently,

Mr. Barney returned the check to Mr. Hansen on November
28, 1984, noting that efforts had been made to have Mr.
Miner execute the check in order to cut off Great Equity's
liability

for the principal

and interest, but that Mr.

Miner had declined to do so (R-650) .

No reasons for the

rejection or objections to the tender were made by Mr.
Miner until the hearing on Great Equity's objection to Mr.
Miner's proposed judgment, held June 16, 1986.
On December 12, 1985, the Utah Supreme Court filed
a per curiam opinion dismissing defendants' appeal (R-607).
The Court noted that there had been no final order that
disposed

of all the issues as to all the parties from

which defendants could take an appeal.

Rather, defendants

had attempted to appeal an interlocutory ruling concerning
GMAC's

judgment

additional

against

attorney's

defendants

and

the

fees to GMAC. Notably,

award

of

the Court

affirmed that no appeal had been taken from GMAC's judgment
against defendants

in Martinez, and that the Court had

only decided the third-party judgment against defendants.
On February 5, 1986, following remittitur of the
case to the District Court (R-606), GMAC filed a motion to
3

enter

final

attorney's

judgment,
fees

establish

and

justify

payment

rights,

certain

bonds

award

(R-613).

However, the defendants filed a motion to disqualify Judge
Conder for bias and prejudice on February 6, 1986 (R-616) .
This motion was denied by the Honorable Philip Fishier on
March 7, 1986 (R-634).
Judge
counsel

Conder,

for

upon

defendants,

hearing,
Mr.

Mark

subsequently
Miner,

to

ordered

prepare

a

judgment

in accordance with the Supreme Court's rulings

(R-637).

The proposed judgment prepared by Mr. Miner was

objected to by Great Equity on the grounds that it would
award

attorney's

Equity,

and

fees

would

to

award

defendants
interest

and

to

against

defendants

Great
beyond

November

7, 1983, the date of tender of principal and

interest

to defendants.

These matters

had

never been

ruled on by the court.
A hearing was held June 16, 1986, wherein the Court
denied defendants' claim of attorney's fees against Great
Equity

as

having

no

legal basis

and

ordered

that

the

November 7, 1983 tenders of principal, interest and costs
to defendants was valid and cut off Great Equity's liability for interest after that date (R-688-690) .

Mr. Miner

was asked by the Court to prepare the order and judgment,
but he refused.

Mr. Barney thereafter prepared the order

and judgment.
The

subsequent

judgment
4

of

the

Court,

appealed

here, dated June 23, 1986, granted judgment for GMAC and
against defendants for $4,717.50, together with interest
at the rate of 14.55 percent A.P.R., until fully paid and
costs of $127.00 and attorney's fees of $3,500.00.
then granted

judgment

for defendants

It

and against Great

Equity for $4,717.50, together with interest at the rate
of 14.55 percent A.P.R. until November 7, 1983 and costs
of $742.85 and no attorney's fees.

The judgment finally

provided that any payment of Great Equity to GMAC would
constitute a satisfaction to the extent thereof of GMAC's
judgment against Great Equity (R-694-696).
On June 24, 1986, GMAC issued a writ of garnishment
to Great Equity for the amount of its judgment to the
defendants as provided in the judgment (R-709-712) .
Equity

answered

1986, totaling

and paid
$6,925.95

this garnishment
(R-702, 703).

Great

on June 26,

In evidence of

this payment, Judge Conder entered an order of satisfaction
of judgment, dated June 26, 1986, for the full amount of
the judgment against Great Equity (R-697, 698). A partial
satisfaction of judgment for $6,925.95 was also entered as
to GMAC's judgment against the defendants on June 23, 1986
(R-699-700).

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Great

Equity

delivered

to GMAC

and defendants a

letter and check constituting tender on November 7, 1983,
5

representing full payment of Great Equity's liability to
all parties
tender

in this

without

objections
tender.
amount

as

any
to

action.

Defendants

objection,
the

amount,

thus

rejected

waiving

kind,

or

any

this

future

conditions

of

The tender was valid as an offer to pay the full
due

court.

on a

specific

obligation

determined

by the

Great Equity lawfully and, of necessity, condi-

tioned

receipt

of tender on a satisfaction of judgment

signed by defendants.

Defendants were free to reserve

their rights of appeal on issues then pending before the
court.

Defendants are estopped from claiming that tender

was ineffective because no final judgment had been entered,
since

defendants

had

the

undeniable

responsibility

prepare and present such judgment to the court.

to

Proper

tender to defendants discharged Great Equity's responsibility for interest and costs after November 7, 1983.
Great Equity is not responsible for the attorney's
fees of any other party in this action.

Defendants waived

any right to attorney's fees by their failure to raise the
issue

until

Supreme

after

Court.

the

case

Further,

had

been

defendants

remanded
failed

to

by

the

plead,

prove, or argue any facts which would provide any legal
basis for attorney's fees.

The basis of bad faith now

argued by defendants must fail because they have failed to
meet

the

statutory

requirements

for

establishing

their

claim, and have cited no legal basis on which they may

6

recover
claim

fees.

Further,

for attorney's

defendants

cannot

establish

a

fees because Great Equity has not

exercised bad faith in this action.
The execution of judgment granted below by means of
garnishment
lawful.

of

Great

Equity

was

completely

The notice and procedural

proper

and

steps taken by the

parties and the court were in accordance with the rules of
law.

The law does not require judgment creditors to give

preference to bonds in the execution of their judgment.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE FINDING AND JUDGMENT BELOW CORRECTLY HELD
THAT GREAT EQUITY MADE GOOD AND VALID TENDER
OF ITS FULL LIABILITY TO GMAC AND DEFENDANTS
ON NOVEMBER 7, 1981, THUS CUTTING OFF ITS
LIABILITY FOR INTEREST AND COSTS.
A.

Defendants Waived Their Objections to Tender
by Their Failure to Offer Any Objections At
the Time of Tender.

Counsel for Great Equity tendered full payment of
its liability

for judgment and costs in its checks and

letter of November 7, 1983, to counsel for GMAC, Mr. Jay
Barney

and

defendant,

Exhibit A, herein).

Mr. Mark Miner

(R-647-648, 652,

This letter in itself constitutes

tender under Utah Code Annotated § 78-27-1 (1953), which
states:
An offer in writing to pay a particular sum
of money or to deliver a written instrument
for specific personal property, is, if not
accepted, equivalent to the actual production
and tender of the money, instrument or
property.
The letter notified Mr. Miner that a check had been drawn
7

and was being forwarded to him.
tion to this letter.
and ordered

Mr. Miner made no objec-

The Honorable Dean E. Conder found

that this tender was valid

Equity had no responsibility

and that Great

for interest to defendants

after that date (R-690).
Actual tender to Mr. Miner was also effectuated by
Great Equity through the actions of Mr. Barney (Exhibit C,
herein, pending

submission to the record).

Mr. Barney

attempted to make tender to Mr. Miner but was rebuffed by
Mr.

Miner

without

objection

to

the

amount

or kind

of

tender.

Mr. Barney wrote Mr. Hansen on November 28, 1984:

"Efforts

were

execute

the

made
check

to have Mr. Miner
that

the

question

and his
of

clients

principal

and

interest accrued might be resolved to cut off the liability
of [Great Equity].

This the defendants have declined to

do" (R-650, Exhibit B, herein).
Mr. Miner was offered the opportunity to object to
tender.

A standard satisfaction of judgment and release

was included with the tender letter and check (See R-647,
Exhibit A, herein).

Defendants were free to sign condi-

tional upon the reservation of their rights with respect
to the issues and on appeal between GMAC and defendants.
The letter of Mr. Barney to Mr. Miner, dated November 16,
1983 further made this clear to Mr. Miner:
[Mr. Hansen] has indicated that he would
have no objection to drawing a release that
would satisfy the principal and interest due
and owing under the contract to [GMAC] and
8

reserve the issue relative to attorney's
fees for further determination on appeal
(Exhibit C, herein, pending submission to
the record).
The ability of a party accepting tender to reserve
his rights to litigate and appeal issues still pending is
clearly recognized

in Utah.

This Court has stated the

rule of law:
Generally, when a judgment creditor accepts
payment and executes a satisfaction of
judgment the controversy becomes moot and
the right of appeal is barred. However, the
general rule does not necessarily prevent an
appeal as to separate and independent claims
if it is shown that a controversy remains in
regard thereto.
Hollinasworth v. Farmers Insurance Co. , 655 P.2d 637, 639
(Utah 1982) (footnotes omitted).
In a decision exactly on point, Jensen v. Eddy, 30
Utah 2d 154, 514 P.2d 1142

(1973), this Court denied a

motion to dismiss plaintiff's appeal on the ground that
plaintiff

had voluntarily

then satisfied.

paid

the judgment, which was

In hearing the appeal, the Court noted

that the parts of the judgment which were paid and satisfied were separate and distinct from the issues presented
on appeal.
tendered

In the present action, Great Equity explicitly

only the principal

and interest due and owing

GMAC under the insurance claim, and the costs of appeal
awarded

by

this

Court

(R-647-650,

Exhibits

A

and

B,

herein; and Exhibit C, pending admission to the record).
These parts of the action were concretely determined by
9

this Court's decision and were not contested by any party
on the date of tender.

Defendants were certainly free to

accept that tender and cut off both their interest and
that

of

Great

Equity

without

possibly

hindering

rights on the issue of attorney's fees.

their

See Golden Spike

Equipment Co. v. Croshaw, 16 Utah 2d 391, 401 P.2d 949
(1965).
Mr.

Miner's

refusal

of

tender

without

objection

waived any objections he may have had to its amount or
terms.

Utah Code Annotated § 78-27-3 (1953), states:
The person to whom a tender is made must, at
the time, specify any objection he may have
to the money, instrument or property, or he
is deemed to have waived it; and, if the
objection is to the amount of money, the
terms of the instrument or the amount or
kind of property, he must specify the
amounts, terms or kind which he requires, or
be precluded from objection afterwards.

Under

these

asserting
adequate.

terms,

the

that the amount
Thus, all

defendants

are

precluded

from

or terms of tender were in-

of defendants' arguments

in this

appeal as to the effectiveness and validity of the November
7, 1983 tender are improper and untimely.
B.

Good and Valid Tender Was Made to GMAC
and to Defendants.

Without waiving its claim that defendants' arguments
against

tender

should

be

rejected

by

the

Court,

Great

Equity will address the merits of defendants' objections.
The tender constituted

an offer to pay the full

amount due on a specific obligation.
10

The Supreme Court

decision of May 24, 1983 clearly established the liability
of Great Equity to pay the benefit under its policy owing
to GMAC.

Martinez, 668 P.2d 498 (R-536).

previously

established

$4,717.50, with
contractual

interest

rate

of

by

the

This amount was

District

from September

14.55 percent

Court

to

be

30, 1981, at a

(R-538, 539).

This

judgment was never appealed as this Court found in its
December 12, 1985 opinion (R-607).
1983, tendered

on November

The check of October 2,

7, 1983, constituted a full

payment of this liability.
The

tender

proper payees.

check

and

letters

were

made

to

the

The Supreme Court decision of May 24,

1983 firmly established the liability of Great Equity to
satisfy the policy claim of the defendants to GMAC as
beneficiary.

Great

Equity

further recognized

that, by

definition, its position as a third-party defendant in the
action, made it "liable to

[the defendants] for all or

part of the Plaintiff's claim against
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule
order

to

properly

satisfy

its

full

[the defendants].11
14(a)

(1953).

liability

to

In
all

parties, Great Equity named as payees on the check the
defendants and their counsel, and GMAC and its counsel.
The propriety of this action is most evident when
the alternatives are examined.

Had Great Equity paid only

the defendants, without a satisfaction of judgment from
GMAC, and the judgment of GMAC was not satisfied thereafter
11

by the defendants, GMAC would still have a valid claim
against Great Equity as a third-party defendant.
Equity

was

bound

to

seek

a satisfaction

from

Great
GMAC

to

prevent the possibility of a double payment of its liability and a resulting claim against defendants.

The same

argument applies to Great Equity's request for satisfaction
from the defendants. As established above, defendants had
notice

and

were

free

to modify

their

satisfaction

to

reserve their rights as to issues still pending.
Defendants
position
Great

that

Equity

the
with

cite

purported

condition
its

of

tender

authority

for

satisfaction
invalidated

their

sought

the

by

tender.

First, as noted above, Great Equity had every right and,
indeed,

the

necessity

of

receiving

judgment upon payment of the same.

a

satisfaction

of

Defendants1 argument

is tantamount to claiming that a debtor has no right to
request a receipt and discharge upon payment of a debt to
his creditor.
in

the

law.

Such a position is wholly without foundation
The

cases

cited

by

defendants

for this

proposition, K. & M. , Inc. v. Le Cuyer, 107 Cal. App. 2d
710, 233 P.2d 569 (1951) and Woods v. Dixon, 193 Or. 628,
240 P.2d 520 (1952), state a principle that tender must be
free from any condition which the tenderer does not have a
right to

insist upon.

However, defendant

can cite no

authority claiming that a judgment debtor has no right to
insist

on

a

satisfaction

of
12

judgment

when

tendering

payment.
mechanism

A

satisfaction

provided

by

of judgment

law to

record

judgment and the end of a lawsuit.

is precisely
the payment

the
of a

See, Utah Rules of

Civil Procedure, Rule 58B (1986).
The remaining authorities cited by defendants are
inapposite to the issues at hand.

The cases of Estate of

Kohlepp v. Mason, 25 Utah 2d 155, 478 P.2d 339

(1970);

Sieverts v. White, 2 Utah 2d 351, 273 P.2d 974 (1954); and
Hyams v, Bamberger,

10 Utah 3, 36 P. 202

(Utah 1894),

deal with the issue of tender by check being ineffective
for lack of sufficient funds.

If defendants intend to

imply that the checks tendered to them were not backed by
sufficient funds, they would be raising the objection for
the first time in this action.
considered here on appeal.

Thus, it could not be

Trayner v. Cushincr, 688 P.2d

856 (Utah 1984) ; Simpson v. General Motors Corp., 24 Utah
2d 301, 470 P.2d 399, 401 (1970).
not

If the defendants do

intend to assert this objection, their reliance on

these authorities

is profoundly misplaced.

Defendants'

citation of Radali v. Union Savings & Loan Ass'n., 59 Wyo.
140, 138 P.2d 984 (1943) is inappropriate in that the case
turns on a Wyoming statute totally inapplicable here.
fact

remains

whatsoever

that

defendants

that would

allow

have
any

cited

The

no

authority

legal basis

for their

untimely and erroneous objections to tender.
Defendants are estopped from asserting that tender
13

was ineffective because no final judgment had been entered
on November 7, 1983.

Defendants were responsible, as the

party obtaining the judgment, to present the final judgment
to the District Court for its approval and entry.

The

Rules of Practice for the District and Circuit Courts of
the State of Utah, in effect at the time of remittitur of
the Supreme Court decision in August of 1983, stated at
Rule 2.9(a):
In all rulings by a court, counsel for the
party or parties obtaining the ruling shall
within fifteen (15) days, or within a
shorter time as the court may direct, file
with the court a proposed order, judgment or
decree in conformity with the ruling.^
This

codifies

and

reinforces

the

well-recognized

duty of a prevailing party receiving a judgment to prepare
that judgment for the signature of the judge and entry in
the

record

pursuant

to

Rule

2.9(b).

Defendants

were

clearly the party which "obtained the ruling" of a court,
here the Supreme Court.
receipt

by

the

District

Further, defendants noted the
Court

of

the

Supreme

Court's

remittitur when it filed its memorandum of costs on August
8,

1983

(R-540-542).

Defendants

failed,

however,

to

prepare the judgment directed by the Supreme Court from May
*Rule 2.9(a) is restated verbatim as the current rule
in Third Judicial District Court Rules of Practice, Rule
4(a), effective April 1, 1984. Rule 4 supersedes Rule 2.9
but restates the pertinent sections referred to here and
in defendants8 brief verbatim.
Defendants1 reference in
their brief to purported violations of Rule 2.9 are thus
incorrect in their citation.
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24, 1983, to April 11, 1986. After the passage of time
made it clear that defendants were not prepared to discharge their responsibility, and in an attempt to halt the
continuing accrual of interest, Great Equity tendered the
full amount of its liability, including costs paid directly
to the defendants, on November 7, 1983 (R-647-652, Exhibit
A, herein).
Based on its responsibility to prepare the judgment,
defendants

are

estopped

form

claiming

that

the

tender

could not satisfy a judgment which had not been entered.
In Estate of McFarland v. Holt. 18 Utah 2d 127, 417 P.2d
244 (1966), this Court found that an executrix was estopped
from

asserting

on appeal

that her

own petition,

filed

without objection, to confirm the sale of certiain estate
property was

insufficient.

The Court held:

"One who

files a pleading asking the court to act thereon vouches
for its verity and should not thereafter be permitted to
repudiate it for the purpose of upsetting the action the
court has taken pursuant to his request."

The present

case presents the reverse side of the same issue.
fails

to

perform

his

recognized

duty

as

One who

required

and

relied upon by the court and the other parties in the
action should not thereafter be permitted to rely on his
neglect to upset the actions of the court and parties to
remedy

his

error.

To permit

such would

allow one to

benefit from his own wrongful omission to act.
15

Defendants1

appeal of October, 1983, did not make

the tender by Great Equity ineffective.

The appeal only

addressed the grant of attorney's fees to GMAC and the
judgment

between

GMAC

and

defendants.

No

issue

was

presented in that appeal nor included in the opinion of
the

Supreme

Court which would

Great Equity

change

or make the tender

the

liability

invalid.

of

The Supreme

Court recognized that the only issues on appeal were the
judgment

between

GMAC

and

attorneyfs fees to GMAC

defendants

(R-607).

and

the

award

of

Likewise, the Amended

Judgment of September 22, 1983, did not affect the amount
of

judgment

between

(R-579-581). That

defendants

Amended

and

Judgment

dealt

Great

Equity

only with the

liability of defendants to GMAC for attorney's fees and
in no way affected the validity of tender offered by Great
Equity as determined by the Supreme Court.
C.

Valid Tender Precludes Any Further
Liability of Great Equity for Interest
and Costs After November 7, 1981.

It is settled law in Utah that a tender of payment
that is rejected discharges interest.
Daniels, 290 F.2d
proval , Utah
1983) .

186

County v.

Because

(10th Cir. 1961), cited with apBrown,

defendants

672 P. 2d 83 n. 9

refused

without objection between November
28, 1984

Woodmont, Inc. v.

a bona

(Utah

fide tender

7, 1983 and November

(the date that the check was returned to Great

Equity by GMAC, R-650, Exhibit B, herein) defendants may
16

not now claim additional interest accruing from November
7, 1983.

Further, defendants are precluded from objecting

to the amount or terms of tender by Utah Code Annotated §
78-27-3 (1953) discussed in Argument I.A., above.
Great Equity is no longer liable to defendants for
the costs of trial.

In a check dated October 13, 1983,

Great Equity paid to defendants and their counsel $742.85,
representing the costs of trial as petitioned by defendants
and approved by the court (R-540-542, 584, 585; see R-652,
Exhibit A, herein).

Because a valid tender of these costs

has been made, defendants may not now claim any continuing
liability of Great Equity for the costs of court.

Utah

Code Annotated § 78-27-3 (1953), discussed above.
II.

GREAT EQUITY IS NOT LIABLE FOR ANY ATTORNEY'S FEES.
A.

Defendants have Waived any Possible Right to
Attorney's Fees Against Great Equity.

Defendants waived any possible right to a grant of
attorney's

fees by their

failure to properly raise the

issue in the District Court.

The appellants third-party

complaint against Great Equity is completely void of any
allegation
(R-ll-22).

for attorney's

fees, under any legal theory

Moreover, there was no evidence presented at

trial in support of any claim against Great Equity for
attorney's

fees.

Likewise, defendants,

in their first

appeal, did not claim that Great Equity was obligated to
pay any attorney's fees.

Defendants first raised the issue

of its right to any attorney's fees after remittitur of
17

the case to the District Court in August of 1983 (R-553) .
However, in their appeal of October, 1983, defendants did
not seek attorney's fees from Great Equity (See R-607).
In Girard v. Appleby,

660 P.2d

245

(Utah 1983),

this Court set forth the legal basis for waiver of attorney's fees:
Preservation of the integrity of the
adversarial system of conducting trials
precludes the court from infringing upon
counsel's role of advocacy.
Counsel is
entitled to control the presentation of
evidence, and should there be a failure to
present evidence on a claim at issue, it is
generally viewed as a waiver of the claim.
In the instant case, we are not apprised
of the reason Girard saw fit to rest her
case without presenting evidence in support
of her claim for attorney's fees. However,
even if it be assumed that it was the result
of oversight, the interests of justice are
not enhanced when the court exceeds its role
as arbiter by reaching out and deciding an
issue that would otherwise be dead, it not
having been litigated at the time of trial.
Id. at 247.

The present facts are an even more compelling

case for waiver.

In Girard, unlike the present case, the

plaintiffs at least presented a claim for attorney's fees
in the pleadings.

The defendants

here have

therefore

waived any claim for attorney's fees and such claims now,
at this stage of the proceedings, would be highly prejudicial to Great Equity.
This Court has previously spoken to those who would
introduce a new theory or doctrine of liability for the
first time on appeal, which would presumably apply follow18

ing

the

remand

judgment.

of an appellate decision

for entry of

The court set forth the following sound policy:

Orderly procedure, whose proper purpose is
the final settlement of controversies,
requires that a party must present his
entire case and his theory or theories of
recovery to the trial court; and having done
so, he cannot thereafter change to some
different theory and thus attempt to keep
in motion a merry-go-round of litigation.
Simpson v. General Motors Corp., 24 Utah 2d 301, 470 P.2d
399, 401 (1970); see Park City v. Ensign Co., 586 P.2d 446
(Utah 1978).
This

Court

has

previously

denied

an

appellant's

attempt to assert his claim for attorney's fees for the
first time on appeal.
(Utah

1984),

the

In Trayner v. Cushincr, 688 P.2d 856

Court

denied

the

appellant's

claim

because he had not presented his basis for fees at the
time of trial.

Here, defendants first made their claim

for fees even later than the appellant in Travner—after
the appellate decision had been rendered.

If defendants

believed that they would prevail against Great Equity at
trial or on appeal, they were bound to raise any claim
they had for attorney's fees at trial.
B.

There is No Contractual or Statutory Basis
for Great Equity to Pay Attorney's Fees.

Without waiving its claim that defendants' arguments
for attorney's fees should be rejected by the Court, Great
Equity will address the merits of defendants' arguments.
Utah

law

does

not

permit
19

defendants

to

recover

attorney's fees in this action.

"It is well established

in our law that attorney's fees cannot be recovered unless
provided for by statute or by contract."

B & R Supply

Co. v. Bringhurst. 28 Utah 2d 442, 444, 503 P.2d 1216,
1217 (1972); Turtle Management, Inc. v. Haggis Management,
645 P.2d 667 (Utah 1982).
identified

by

defendant

No statute or contract has been
which

would

allow

recovery

of

attorney's fees here.
The only contractual basis

for any fees in this

case is the defendants' unilateral promise to pay GMAC's
costs in enforcing the installment contract.

The insurance

agreement with Great Equity is a totally separate agreement
between Great Equity and defendants.

GMAC is merely a

third-party beneficiary to the insurance policy.

The fact

that the disability policy was a condition to the installment contract is independent of Great Equity's obligations.
GMAC's

predecessor,

Streator

Chevrolet,

insurance policy for its own protection.
no part

in the

initiation

required

the

Great Equity had

or terms of the

installment

contract.
The

separate

nature

of

the

insurance

contract,

apart from the installment contract, is recognized by Utah
Code

Annotated

§

31-34-(l)

Court's prior opinion.

(1953),

discussed

Martinez, 668 P.2d 498

in

this

(R-536).

The requirement for approval and delivery of the insurance
policy by the insurance company, rather than the creditor,
20

shows the separate nature of the interests of the two.
The simple fact is that the defendants1 collateral promise
to pay GMAC's attorney's fees is their personal obligation
which they voluntarily undertook without regard to whether
a third party would relieve them of that obligation.
Even

if the

insurance

contract

did expressly or

impliedly contain an assumption of all of the defendants1
collateral

obligations

under

the

installment

contract,

which it did not, defendants are estopped from asserting
such

a

claim

under

the

prior

decision

in

this case.

Martinez, 668 P.2d 498 (R-536).

There, this Court held

that Great Equity was estopped

from relying on express

terms

of

the

insurance

contract

because

the

documents

containing the terms were not delivered to the defendants.
Id. at 501.

This was because the defendants never knew of

the terms of the policy and could not be bound by something
they did not agree to. Id.
argument runs both ways.
on

express

which

are

or

implied

Fairness dictates that this

The appellants cannot now rely

terms of the

favorable to them

and

which are not in their favor.

insurance

disregard

contract

those terms

Since the defendants never

knew the terms of the master policy, they cannot claim
reliance

on or expectation

of the

assumption

of their

collateral obligations.
C.

Defendants Have Presented No Legal Basis for
the Award of Attorney's Fees.

Defendants, in their appeal and their arguments to
21

the

District

which

Court,

allows

breach

of

dealing
stated

the recovery

an

in
in

appear

implied

an
a

where

upon

the

of attorney's

covenant

insurance
case

to rely

of good

contract.
this

Court

exception

fees upon
faith

This

and

the
fair

exception

specifically

is

held

against an award of attorney's fees in a case similar to
the one at bar and relying in part on its prior decision
here.

In Farmers Insurance Exchange v. Call, 712 P.2d 231

(Utah 1985), before attorney's fees could be awarded in
the absence of a statute or contract, the Court held, "it
must appear that the insurance company acted in bad faith
or fraudulently or was stubbornly litigious."
citing
Utah

American

2d

further

161,
held

States

486
that

Insurance

P.2d

1042,

an award

Id. at 237,

Company v. Walker,

1044

(1971).

of attorney's

The
fees

26

Court
is not

warranted where the company merely states its position and
sues for a determination of what appears to be a justiciable controversy.
Each

and

Farmers. 712 P.2d at 237.
every

authority

cited by defendants in

their brief and below concerns the recovery of attorney's
fees when the bad faith of the insurer has been established.

The bad faith of Great Equity has never been

pled, proven, or raised in any proceeding of this action.
There are several bases upon which defendants' claim for
attorney's fees must fail.
First, defendants have not pled, proven or argued
22

to the District Court the requisite facts and law required
to establish a claim for attorney's fees, as set forth in
Utah Code Annotated § 78-27-56 (1953 as amended):
In civil actions, where not otherwise
provided by statute or agreement, the court
may award reasonable attorney's fees to a
prevailing party if the court determines
that the action or defense to the action was
without merit and not brought or asserted in
good faith.
This section has been interpreted to require that
specific elements be proven in order to recover attorney's
fees.

Cadv v. Johnson, 671 P.2d 149 (Utah 1983).

There

must also be a finding of fact of bad faith on the part of
the insurer before fees may be awarded.
Sur.

Co. v.

Marchant.

615 P.2d

Western Cas. &

423, 427

(Utah

1980).

Defendants have neither pled nor proven these elements in
this action.

The District Court never made any statement

or finding that could conceivably imply any bad faith on
the part of Great Equity.
Second, defendants' authority cited in its brief is
entirely inapposite and does not support their position in
this

issue.

Defendants

rely

on Sieael

Bookhultz & Sons, Inc., 419 F.2d

720

v. William E.

(D.C. Cir. 1969),

which is wholly inapposite as a "duty to defend" action
against an insurer.
estopped

from

The court held that the insurer was

discontinuing

its defense of the insured

after it had defended the action for one and a half years,
and that the discontinuance of defense was unreasonable
23

and unjustified, tantamount to bad faith.
of bankruptcy

and

were at issue.

No such situation exists here.

Defendants1

insured's

reliance

inability

Further, issues

to defend

on Eaan v. Mutual

itself

of Omaha

Insurance Company, 169 Cal. Rptr. 691, 620 P.2d 141 (1979)
is

likewise

misplaced.

There,

an

insurer

failed

to

conduct a complete examination of a claim, resulting in
the denial of benefits.

The trial court found a breach of

the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and
held that when an insurer unreasonably and in bad faith
fails to pay the claim, there is liability in tort.

The

issue of tort liability for bad faith was pled and proven
and was decided by the jury.

In the case at bar, there

has been neither pleading nor proof of any tort liability.
Neither has the issue of bad faith been presented to the
jury.

Nonetheless, defendant

supports the reasoning of

Ecran by

citing

Dinkinas v. American

National

Insurance

Company.

92 Cal. App. 3d 222, 154 Cal. Rptr. 775

(1979),

which held that insureds may recover the amount of attorney's
policy.

fees

to

establish

liability

under

an

insurance

However, defendants fail to note here, as they

also failed to do below, that this holding in Dinkinas was
disapproved

in Moore v. American United

Life

Insurance

Company. 150 Cal. App. 3d 610, 197 Cal. Rptr. 878 (1984).
There, reviewing California cases concerning the award of
attorney's fees, the court held that, in the absence of an

24

agreement between the parties, attorney's fees would not
be

recoverable

in bad

faith

actions

against

insurance

companies, and specifically disapproved Dinkings.

Moore,

197 Cal. Rptr. at 900-901.
Sukup v.

State,

19 N.Y.2d

519, 281 N.Y.S.2d

28

(1967), cited by defendants below, directly supports the
position of Great Equity.

There, an insurer failed to pay

a claim under workmen's compensation insurance.

The Court

of Appeals held that the language of the policy allowed
coverage, and that
legal

controversy

"all this amounts to is an adverse
between

the

carrier

and

insured

for

which no liability for the legal fees of one party would
be chargeable to the other in the absence of some extraordinary showing."

Sukup, 281 N.Y.S.2d at 30.

The court

found that the issue of bad faith had never been pled or
asserted during trial.
the record
based.

Further, there was no evidence on

from which a finding of bad faith could be

Thus,

they

determined

that

an

insured

cannot

recover attorney's fees in a legitimate controversy with a
carrier over coverage even though the carrier loses the
controversy and must pay the claim.
It would require more than an arguable
difference of opinion between carrier and
insured over coverage to impose an extra
contractual liability for legal expenses . .
It would be such bad faith in denying
coverage that no reasonable carrier would .
. . be expected to assert it.
Sukup, 281 N.Y.S.2d at 31.

This position is the law in
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Utah under Western Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Marchant, 615 P.2d
423, 427 (Utah 1980).

Such a situation certainly has not

been shown by defendants and, indeed, does not
this action.

exist in

Martinez. 668 P.2d at 498 (R-536).

Finally,

defendants

cannot

establish

a claim

for

attorney's fees because Great Equity has not exercised bad
faith in this matter.

An insurer is entitled to challenge

claims on the basis of debatable facts without being found
in breach of its obligation of good faith and fair dealing.
Couch

on

Insurance

2d

§§

58:1; 58:8.

This has been

reaffirmed by this Court in Farmers Insurance Exchange v.
Call, 712 P.2d 231, 237-238 (Utah 1985), discussed above.
No issue was raised nor was evidence presented to the jury
which

would

dealing

indicate

on the part

the

lack

of good

of Great Equity.

faith

and

Nowhere

fair

in the

decisions of either this Court in Martinez or the District
Court is there any intimation of a lack of good faith and
fair dealing on the part of Great Equity.
v.

Safeco

Title

Insurance

Company,

598

See, Espinoza
P. 2d

346

(Utah

1979) (proponent must raise and prove a breach of duty of
good faith to recover attorney's fees).
Great

Equity's

legal

position

at

trial

and

the

prior appeal meets the standard of a bona fide question
about its legal obligations.

This is borne out by the

findings of the jury, the ruling of the trial court, and
the 3-2 decision of the Court in the initial appeal.
26

A

frivolous position for these purposes is one having "no
legal basis."
be

labeled

Cady, 671 P.2d at 151.

as

A claim should not

"frivolous" merely because

it ultimately

does not prevail.
There

is no

bad

faith

express term in a contract.

in merely

relying

on an

Although Great Equity was not

allowed to rely on the exclusionary term, the Court in the
prior

appeal

apparently

assumed

otherwise valid and enforceable.
501 (R-536).

that

the

clause

was

Martinez, 668 P.2d at

The Court also noted that the estoppel arose

as a matter of law, thus negating the possibility of some
factual basis that could have put Great Equity on notice
of the possibility of estoppel.

Id. at 502.

There is no indication that Great Equity intended
to

hinder,

delay

or

defraud

anyone.

The

defendants

emphasize that Great Equity did not deny coverage until
eight months after the disability began.

This fact is not

established in the record and is meaningless in any event
because GMAC had agreed to delay filing suit on the debt
until

Great

Equity

had

completed

Martinez, 668 P.2d at 500 (R-536).

its

investigation.

Thus, the defendants

were in no increased danger of loss because of the delay.
Great Equity further submits that every party has a
duty to mitigate damage when a breach of duty occurs.
Defendants1

counsel agreed with Judge Conder that defen-

dants were individually in default and were liable on the
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installment contract notwithstanding the existence of an
insurance contract
installment
This

is

(R-521-525).

contract

the

When the breach of the

occurred,

conclusion

of

defendants

law

of

the

were

liable.

District

Court

(R-537-538).

In accordance with their duty to mitigate

losses,

should

they

have

tendered

full

performance

to

GMAC, then proceeded against Great Equity for their losses
in having to perform.
would

not have

suit.
of

Had they tendered performance, GMAC

incurred

the expenses

in issue

in this

Thus, only two parties would have had the expenses

one

round

of

litigation,

instead

of

three

bearing the expense of two rounds of litigation:

parties
"To the

extent the damages sustained are the result of the party's
failure to exercise
recover."

such care and diligence, he cannot

DeBry & Hilton Travel Services, Inc. v. Capitol

International

Airways,

Inc.,

583

P.2d

1181

(Utah 1978)

(footnote omitted).

III.

SATISFACTION OF JUDGMENT BY GARNISHMENT IS A PROPER
METHOD OF EXECUTION AND WAS PROPERLY EXECUTED HERE.
Defendants

have

raised

as

an

issue

here

the

propriety of the garnishment employed to partially execute
the June 23, 1986, Amended Judgment.
paid by Great Equity on June 26, 1986.

The garnishment was
While this was the

same day that defendants1 "Notice of Intent to Appeal" was
filed in the court, Great Equity had not received any such
notice at the time payment was made to GMAC to satisfy the
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judgment as ordered and approved by the District Court. In
any case, such a "notice" provides no notice of an actual
appeal and has little, if any, effect.
Defendants

imply

Presented on Appeal

in

their

Statement

of

Issues

(Appellants' brief at p.l) that the

District Court erred in not requiring GMAC to execute on
the bonds

in the

file before

against Great Equity.

executing

by

garnishment

Such an allegation, of course, has

no foundation whatsoever in the law.

Defendant neither

cites any authority for his proposition, nor can he.

The

issue seems to be so obvious that no significant litigation
has occurred on the subject since the law only debates
legitimate and realistic issues.

Bonds are clearly only a

security device and have never been elevated in the law to
receive preference

as a method

of execution

generally.

Only in a situation where the law of a contract between
specific parties governs would such a limitation be placed
on a judgment creditor.

(Great Equity assumes for these

purposes, but does not concede, that the bonds referred to
by defendants are or ever were actually valid and capable
of execution.)
Due to their total failure to mention the issue of
satisfaction

of judgment

through the bonds at any time

prior to this appeal, defendants have waived their right
to appeal this issue.

While the continuing validity of

the bonds has been argued below, at no time have defendants
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intimated that the bonds must be the primary source of
execution
decided

by
by

GMAC.
the

The

District

issue was
Court,

never mentioned
As

discussed

or

above,

Trayner v. Cushinq, 688 P.2d 856 (Utah 1984); Simpson v,
General Motors Corp.. 24 Utah 2d 301, 470 P.2d 399 (1970);
and

a host

of

other decisions prevent

defendants

from

raising this issue for the first time here.
The method
judgment

of

the

of execution
District

employed

Court

to satisfy the

followed

appropriate

procedure as prescribed in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

Rule 69 allows for execution of a judgment by a

writ of execution "unless the court otherwise directs."
Rule 64D(a) (ii) provides a writ of garnishment as an aid
to satisfy a money judgment.

Nowhere in Rules 64A or 64D

is there any requirement that notice be given to a judgment
debtor prior to service on a garnishee.
only

required

under Rule

64A

Prior notice is

for prejudgment

garnishment, which does not apply here.

writs of

Consequently, the

procedures employed here were proper contrary to defendants » obj ections.
Defendant claims the District Court violated Rule
2.9 of the Rules of Practice of the District and Circuit
Courts of the State of Utah in its June 1986 allowance of
garnishment without notice to defendants.

First, Rule 2.9

is an improper citation of the rule defendant advances, as
discussed in footnote 1 above.
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Second, Rule 4(b) of the

Third

judicial

District

Court

Rules of Practice, which

does state defendant's rule, applies explicitly only to
proposed orders, judgments, or decrees of the court.

A

writ of garnishment does not fall under the auspices of
the Rule.

Therefore, the District Court could not possibly

have violated the Rule.
Defendants also claim that the satisfaction order
of the District Court was improper because it was entered
without

notice

Procedure,

Rule

to the defendants. Utah Rules
58B(b)

(1986)

authorizes

the

of Civil
court

enter a satisfaction order upon motion and proof.
requirements were met here (R-699-703) .

to

These

Both Rule 2.9 of

the Rules of Practice and Rule 4 of the Third District
Rules allow entry of orders such as this without notice to
all parties when the court so order.

Thus, the District

Court acted well within authorized limits in entering the
satisfaction.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth in the briefs of respondents, the Court should affirm the Amended Judgment of the
District court dated June 23, 1986, dismiss defendants'
claim for attorney's fees from Great Equity, and uphold
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the

satisfaction

of

judgiaent

entered

by

the

District

court.
DATED this /o^

day of January, 1987.
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL, P.C.

r

e^c^

^ t y ^ ^ ^ ^

iam jrTlansen "^
Robert K. Hilder
Attorneys for Great Equity Life
Insurance Company
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
This is to certify that four copies of the foregoing
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT GREAT EQUITY LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY
were mailed, postage prepaid, this

_day of January,

1987, to each of the following:
Jay V. Barney, Esq.
Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent
General Motors Acceptance Corporation
45 East Vine Street
Murray, Utah 84107
Mark S. Miner, Esq.
Attorney for defendants
Hector Martinez and Manuel Rivera
525 Newhouse Building
10 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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EXHIBITS
Exhibit A:

Documents of Tender on November 7, 1983
Letter from Mr. Hansen to Mssrs. Barney
and Miner, dated November 7, 1983 (R-647)
Copy of check from Great Equity to GMAC
and defendants for principal and interest
in the sum of $6,135.36, dated October 18,
1983 and attached to above letter of
November 7, 1983 (R-648)
Copy of check from Great Equity
defendants for costs in the sum
$7 42.85, dated October 13, 1983,
attached to above letter of November
1983 (R-652)

to
of
and
7,

Exhibit B:

Letter from Mr. Barney to Mr. Hansen, cc.
Mr. Miner, dated November 28, 1984,
indicating return of the check for
$6,135.36 following attempts by Mr. Barney
to have Mr. Miner accept the check (R-650)

Exhibit C:

Letter from Mr. Barney to Mr. Miner,
dated November 16, 1983, attempting to
effectuate tender of the check for
$6,135.36 from Great Equity and indictating the willingness of GMAC and Great
Equity to accept Mr. Miners's signature of
the satisfaction of judgment subject
to defendants' then-pending issues on
appeal. This letter is pending submission
to the record.
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OFFICES

C H R I S T E N S E N , J E N S E N & POWELL
RAY R.CHRtSTENSEN
JAY £. JENSEN
ELWOOO P. POWELL
ROGER P. CHRISTENSEN
OALE J . LAMBERT
L. RICH HUMPHERYS
TOOO S.WINEGAR
DENTON M. HATCH
WILLIAM J . HANSEN
M DOUGLAS BAYLY
PHILLIP S. FERGUSON
RICHARD C- RIFE
ROGER R. FAIRBANKS
BRYAN A. LARSON
JAN P. MALMBERG

9 0 0 KEARNS BUILDING

E. R.CHRISTENSEN
(1886-1979)

136 SOUTH MAIN STREET
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH SAIOI

TELEPHONE 3 5 5 - 3 * 3 1
AREA CODE 8 0 1

November 7, 1983

Jay V. Barney, Esq.
Attorney for Plaintiff
45 East Vine Street
Murray, Utah 84107
Mark S. Miner, Esq.
Attorney for Defendants
525 Newhouse Building
10 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Re:

GMAC v. Hector Martinez - Great Equity Life, et al.

Dear Gentlemen:
I have enclosed a check to Jay in the amount of $6,135.36
made payable to Hector Martinez, Manuel Rivera and their attorney
Mark Miner and GMAC and its attorney Jay Barney, and have also
enclosed a check to Mark in the amount of $742.85 made out to
Hector Martinez, Manuel Rivera and their attorney Mark S. Miner.
In addition, I have forwarded the original release to
Jay for the signature of his client, after which I would appreciat
it if he would forward the same to Mark in order to obtain the
signature of his client.
Also, the negotiation of the settlement check is conditior
upon receiving a satisfaction of judgment from Mr. Miner.
Thank you for your cooperation.
Yours truly,

William J. Hansen
WJH:kp
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CLAIM CHECK

GREAT EQUITY.-LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY

413455 No. £ 1
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.
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RNAL "
PARTIAL

I

0/OQ/OG

C/GQ/OQ

0AIE

AMOUNT
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, 1 3 5 * * COLLARS AMD

HECTOR HARTIftSZ,. MANUEL RIVERA SOOOIOO
£ THEIR ATTY MARK KIHEK S.
QiXC £ ITS ATTY,
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84111
NATIONAL SANK Or CHICAGO

^ItiSliESa1

^6,125.36

36 CE.NTS
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NOT VALID CYEH SS&OG
UNLESS CCUNTE?.S;G,NE:-
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IF NOT CCnncC? PLEASE NOTIFY US PROMPTLY.

STATE •

0!
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f ^ » f —o

CSSTiFiCATc/PCUCY
NUMSEr.

Z^lc

A536S14

|

DATE ISSUED

S/12/73

LCSS

T==M
M

'~ jKThLY-INn
3a

•123.75

DATE

11/19/73

FEr.ICC C SVEF.SD
Fr.CM
TC

0/00/00

C/OG/OG
UPS

•ynvent is PARTIAL, the ciatmant has been advised that further
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s
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|

X
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/> ^

CLAIUOiBCX

GREAT .EQUITY .LIFE"INSURANCE COMPANY'

412**7 No; 422487
Z • PSnlOO COVE-ED
-PROM

--*

'O/00/Qfl

PARTIAL

- -

^ 7

TO — - -

L;"0/CJQ/QQ

OAlc

AMOUNT

10/13783
14742^=? 'DOLLARS AND
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CzXTS

HECTOR MARTINEZ MANUEL.K.
RIVERA AND TKEJR ATTORNEY
HARK S . MINER

2-1

*—742.55

NOT VALID OVSr.SSSaoO
UNLESS COUNTERSIGNED

SGCGiGG

//-.

84111

/jy^

M

NATIONAL SANK OF CHICAGO

«iiticii5 7"I-^0?iOOCCi3i:
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8416

A536914

|

TE=.M

DATE ISS'JSD
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J
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JJO

• 138.75
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DATE
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PESiCD CCVSr.SD
FnCM
TC

G/CQ/GQ

.0/00/00 I
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yme.nt is PARTIAL, the dsimant has bean advised that further
-ents are contir.cent on the receipt of the continuing ciaim form
:h is the bottom portion of the Claimant's copy.

r

HECTOR
. MARTINEZ
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JORDAN, UTAH
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DAY. B A R N E Y & T Y C K S E N
ATTO»N€Y3 AT
DAVIO H

DAT

CAST

V 3ARNCV
STCVCN C TrClSCM

LAW

V,NC

**
3TPCCT
MuRMAV. UTAH 3 * t 0 7

JAf

P A T R I C * &. C A S A O A *

800 262*6600

November 28, 1984
Mr. William J. Hansen
Attorney at Law
Christensen, Jensen 6 Powell
900 Kearns Building
136 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

Dear Bill:
enclosed please find your check which you forwarded to us in
November 1983 for payment off Great Equity's obligation under the
case of GMAC - Martinez - Great equity Llfg inaucJULe Cuuijjauy.—
Efforts were made to have Mr» Miner and his clients execute
the check that the question off principal and interest accrued
aiqht be resolved to cufc oft: the liability 6ff yaug Cliaflte This
the defendants have declined to do.
Inasmuch as the check is now stale, and no cooperation is
forthcoming from the defendants, GMAC is unable to apply the
proceeds to cut off its claims*
In a recent conversation with Jeffff Barnum, Utah Supreme
Court Clerk, it appears that it will be several weeks before a
hearing may be held in this case.
Thank you Cor your cooperation* It is unfortunate that we
were unable to make this resolution* It would appear, iff GMAC
prevails in the next case aa it has in the past, in our opinion,
the defendants may be liable for further attorney's fees and
accumulated interest as a consequence of their refusal to endorse
this check to satisfy the obligation to GMAC*
Sincerely,

Sjty
JVB/bb
Enc«
cc* Mark S, Miner, Bsq*
CopYT
ocu&tr

Exhibit B

VU Barney

#

DAY, B A R N E Y & T Y C K S E N
DAV»O K DAY
JAY V. E U R N C Y
STCVCM C.TYCHSCN

A T T O R N E Y S AT LAW
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CAST V I N C S T R E E T

MURRAY. UTAH 8 4 I 0 7

(doo 262 -eeoo

November 16, 1983
Mr. Mark Miner
Attorney at Law
525 Newhouse Building
10 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Re:

GMAC v. Hector Martinez v. Great Equity Life

Dear Mark:
Recently we received a check in the sum of $*>, 135.36,
payable by great Equity Lite Insurance Company to "HECTOR
HAAflMBZ, MANUEL RIVERA, i THBJCR ATT?V MAAk MINER & GMAC & ITS
'Affv, JAy BARNsyy
~"
This check represents the accumulated interest and principal
due and owing under the judgment up to mid-October, 198J.
"~
GMAC is willing to receive this check in satisfaction of its
debt and obligation and terminate interest as of October lb,
1983. provided that the check is endorsee py your clients and
yourself and returned to GMAC to sacisry ica claimGMAC does not, however, release its claim and rights to
attorney's fees.
Mr* Hansen had sent a release document that appeared to be a
general release to be signed by the parties. I contacted Mr.
Hansen on November 11th to discuss the same. I advised that you
were appealing the question of attorney^ fees to the Utah
Supreme Court relative to the obligation of Great Equity Life to
reimburse your client for attorney's fees and to pay the attorney's fees claimed by GMAC against your client. , I advised Mr.
Hansen that we would not be in a position to execute any release
without reserving these rights. Bill has indicated tnat ne wouic
have no objection to drawing "a release that would satisfy the
principal and Interest due and owing under the contract to
general Motors Acceptance Corporation and rmsMOia-XJie-j^ZES^ .

Exhibit C

Page 2

Would you kindly advise whether such a procedure would be
acceptable to you and your clients* In the event we cannot come
to an immediate resolution of the case, then your clients must
understand that they will continue to be responsible for accruing
interest under the judgment entered against them.
It would appear that we should be able to resolve the issue
concerning principal and interest without violating your client's
claims for attorney's fees nor the claims o£ GMAC witn respect fco
its attorney's fees claim*
Please advise as to your position*
Sincerely,
DAY, BAHNEY 6 TYCKSEN

f ^ayo/f. Barney
JVB/bb
cc: William J* Hansen, Esq*
Mr. Art Beery, GMAC

fj

